THE STATE OF TEXAS

§ IN THE 174TH DISTRICT COURT

VS.

§ OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

JUAN CARLOS MOLINA § AUGUST TERM, A. D., 2007

Members of the Jury:

The defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, stands charged by indictment with the offense of capital murder, alleged to have been committed on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas. The defendant has pleaded not guilty.

A person commits the offense of murder if he:

- (1) intentionally (or) knowingly causes the death of an individual;
- (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and intentionally or knowingly commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or
- (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

A person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally commits murder, as hereinbefore defined paragraph (1), and the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery or the offense of kidnapping.

Robbery and kidnapping are felony offenses.

"Attempt" to commit an offense occurs if, with specific intent to commit an offense, a person does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends, but fails, to effect the commission of the offense intended.

A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft, as that term is hereinafter defined, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property of another, he:

- (1) intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another; or
- (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.

A person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if the person commits robbery, as hereinbefore defined, and the person causes serious bodily injury to another.

"In the course of committing theft" means conduct that occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft.

"Theft" is the unlawful appropriation of property with intent to deprive the owner of property.

"Appropriation" and "appropriate", as those terms are used herein, means to acquire or otherwise exercise control over property other than real property. Appropriation of property is unlawful if it is without the owner's effective consent.

"Property" as used herein means tangible or intangible personal property or documents, including money, that represents or embodies anything of value.

"Deprive" means to withhold property from the owner permanently or for so extended a period of time that a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property is lost to the owner.

"Effective consent" means assent in fact, whether express or apparent, and includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if induced by force, threats or fraud.

"Owner" means a person who has title to the property, possession of property, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.

"Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management of the property.

A person commits the offense of kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person.

A person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to:

- (1) facilitate the commission of a felony or the flight after the attempt or commission of a felony; or
- (2) inflict bodily injury on him.

The term "abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by:

- (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or
- (B) using or threatening to use deadly force.

The term "restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty, by moving him from one place to another or by confining him.

Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception.

"Consent" means assent in fact, whether express or apparent.

"Deadly force" means force that is intended or known by the person acting to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.

"Deadly weapon" means anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

The definition of intentionally relative to the offense of capital murder is as follows:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

The definitions of intentionally and knowingly relative to the offense of murder are as follow:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

The definitions of intentionally and knowingly relative to the offenses of robbery, aggravated robbery, kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping are as follow:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

Before you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of capital murder, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt not only that on the occasion in question the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of robbery of Jeanette Gonzales, as alleged in this charge, but also that the defendant specifically intended to cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales, by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely deadly weapon; or

You must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt not only that on the occasion in question the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of kidnapping of Jeanette Gonzales, as alleged in this charge, but also that the defendant specifically intended to cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales, by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a

moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely a deadly weapon, and unless you so find, then you cannot convict the defendant of the offense of capital murder.

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the robbery of Jeanette Gonzales, intentionally cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely deadly weapon; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the kidnapping of Jeanette Gonzales, intentionally cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely a deadly weapon, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of capital murder and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of murder.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales, by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely a deadly weapon; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully intend to cause serious bodily injury to Jeanette Gonzales, and did cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales by intentionally or knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to

human life, namely, by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely a deadly weapon; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, commit or attempt to commit the felony offense of robbery of Jeanette Gonzales, and while in the course of and furtherance of the commission of or the attempt to commit said offense did commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, towit: by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, namely a deadly weapon, and did thereby cause the death of Jeanette Gonzales, then you will find the defendant guilty of murder.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of murder and next consider whether the defendant is quilty of the offense of aggravated robbery.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Jeanette Gonzales and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to Jeanette Gonzales, by pushing Jeanette Gonzales out of a moving vehicle onto a concrete pavement, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of aggravated robbery and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of the offense of aggravated kidnapping.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly abduct Jeanette Gonzales, without her consent, with intent to prevent her

liberation by secreting or holding Jeanette Gonzales in a place where Jeanette Gonzales was not likely to be found; or by using or threatening to use deadly force, and with intent to facilitate the commission of the robbery of Jeanette Gonzales or the flight after the attempt or commission of the robbery of Jeanette Gonzales; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly abduct Jeanette Gonzales, without her consent, with intent to prevent her liberation by secreting or holding Jeanette Gonzales in a place where Jeanette Gonzales was not likely to be found; or by using or threatening to use deadly force, and with intent to inflict bodily injury on Jeanette Gonzales, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of aggravated kidnapping and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of robbery.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Jeanette Gonzales and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly threaten or place Jeanette Gonzales in fear of imminent bodily injury or death; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Jeanette Gonzales, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to Jeanette Gonzales, then you will find the defendant guilty of robbery.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of robbery and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of kidnapping.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of August, 2006, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly abduct Jeanette Gonzales, without her consent, with intent to prevent her liberation by secreting or holding Jeanette Gonzales in a place where Jeanette Gonzales was not likely to be found; or by using or threatening to use deadly force, then you will find the defendant guilty of kidnapping.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of kidnapping.

If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either capital murder on the one hand or murder, aggravated robbery or aggravated kidnapping on the other hand, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant's favor and find him guilty of one of the lesser offenses of murder, aggravated robbery or aggravated kidnapping.

If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either murder, aggravated robbery or aggravated kidnapping on the one hand or robbery on the other hand, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant's favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense of robbery.

If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either robbery on the one hand or kidnapping on the other hand, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant's favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense of kidnapping.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of any offense defined in this charge you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict "Not Guilty."

Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime. "Intoxication" means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.

An accomplice, as the term is here used, means anyone connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the offense, and whether or not they were present and participated in the commission of the crime. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible or by both. Mere presence alone, however, will not constitute one a party to an offense.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. The term "conduct" means any act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

You are instructed that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the jury first believes that the accomplice's testimony is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him, and even then you cannot convict unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission.

The witness, Claudia Fuentes, is an accomplice, if an offense was committed, and you cannot convict the defendant upon her testimony unless you first believe that the testimony of Claudia Fuentes is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment; and even then you cannot convict the defendant unless you further believe that there is other evidence in the case, outside of the testimony of Claudia Fuentes tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed, if you find that an offense was committed, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but

it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission, and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him.

You are further instructed that if there is any evidence before you in this case regarding the defendant's committing an alleged offense or offenses other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider such evidence for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other offense or offenses, if any, and even then you may only consider the same in determining the motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident of the defendant, if any, in connection with the offense, if any, alleged against him in the indictment and for no other purpose.

A defendant in a criminal case is not bound by law to testify in his own behalf therein and the failure of any defendant to so testify shall not be taken as a circumstance against him nor shall the same be alluded to nor commented upon by the jury, and you must not refer to, mention, comment upon or discuss the failure of the defendant to testify in this case. If any juror starts to mention the defendant's failure to testify in this case then it is the duty of the other jurors to stop him at once.

You are further instructed that any evidence that any witness has been convicted in any case or cases was admitted before you for the purpose of aiding you, if it does aid you, in passing upon the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his or her testimony, and you will not consider the same for any other purpose.

A Grand Jury indictment is the means whereby a defendant is brought to trial in a felony prosecution. It is not evidence of guilt nor can it be considered by you in passing upon the question of guilt of the defendant. The burden of proof in all criminal cases rests upon the State throughout the trial and never shifts to the defendant.

All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that he has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.

It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution's proof excludes all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt.

In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your verdict "Not Guilty."

You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but the law you shall receive in these written instructions, and you must be governed thereby.

After you retire to the jury room, you should select one of your members as your Foreman. It is his or her duty to preside at your deliberations, vote with you, and when you have unanimously agreed upon a verdict, to certify to your verdict by

using the appropriate form attached hereto and signing the same as Foreman.

During your deliberations in this case, you must not consider, discuss, nor relate any matters not in evidence before you. You should not consider nor mention any personal knowledge or information you may have about any fact or person connected with this case which is not shown by the evidence.

No one has any authority to communicate with you except the officer who has you in charge. After you have retired, you may communicate with this Court in writing through this officer. Any communication relative to the cause must be written, prepared and signed by the Foreman and shall be submitted to the court through this officer. Do not attempt to talk to the officer who has you in charge, or the attorneys, or the Court, or anyone else concerning any questions you may have.

Your sole duty at this time is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant under the indictment in this cause and restrict your deliberations solely to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant.

Following the arguments of counsel, you will retire to consider your verdict.

George H. Godwin, Judge 174th District Court

Harris County, TEXAS

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CAUSE NO. 1082890

IN THE 174TH DISTRICT COURT THE STATE OF TEXAS § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS VS. AUGUST TERM, A. D., 2007 JUAN CARLOS MOLINA CHOOSE ONE "We, the Jury, find the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment." FILED Theresa Chang District Clerk "We, the Jury, find the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, guilty of murder." Foreman of the Jury (Please Print) Foreman "We, the Jury, find the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, guilty of aggravated robbery." Foreman of the Jury (Please Print) Foreman "We, the Jury, find the defendant, Juan Carlos Molina, guilty of aggravated kidnapping." Foreman of the Jury (Please Print) Foreman

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